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Abstract 
Alfred Winslow Jones was a socialist who founded the first hedge fund in 1949. Born in 1900, he had occupied 
successive positions of diplomatic, academic, and journalistic influence, ad his invention of the modern hedge 
fund has had an outsized impact on global capitalism’s contemporary round of financialization. His life would 
therefore appear to offer ideal material for a “great-man” biography. Yet this “great man” also recognized that 
structural forces were continually undermining his hopes for social chnge. Following Georgi Derluguian, 
Giovanni Arrighi, and Marc Bloch, this article proposes a world-system biography of Jones as a method better 
suited for mapping the internal dialectics of twentieth-century capitalism, using Jones as a human connection 
between cyclical and structural transformations of capitalism, and across hanges of phase from financial to 
material expansion—and back again. Contemporary hedge funds are the material and symbolic quintessence of 
the current, hyper-financialized world-system and its ongoing crises of inequality and overaccumulation, or David 
Harvey’s “vulture capitalism.” Yet they were conceived by a man devoted to rectifying the political-economic 
chaos following an earlier crisis of overaccumulation. On another level, this article suggests a theoretical 
reorientation—toward what Bloch called “the human element”—for studies of capitalism’s cultural and material 
history. It argues that such a reorientation would hold rewards for the “new history of capitalism” field, which 
until now has pursued its quarry primarily by tracing the movements of commodities, capital, institutions, and 
ideas. 
Keywords: New history of capitalism, world-system biography, hedge funds, socialism, change of phase, 
financialization. 
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What is it that seems to dictate the intervention of history? It is the appearance of the 
human element....The good historian is like the giant of the fairy tale. He knows that 
wherever he catches the scent of human flesh, there his quarry lies. (Bloch 1964: 25-26)
  
Alfred Winslow Jones created the first modern hedge fund in 1949. He was also a socialist. He 
had been a purser on a tramp steamer, U.S. Vice Consul in Berlin from 1931 to 1932, Soviet 
sympathizer and anti-Nazi spy with German socialists, humanitarian observer during the Spanish 
Civil War, acclaimed sociologist of class, and an editor for Fortune magazine. In all these roles, 
Jones’s passion remained his lifelong struggle with what he saw as the crucial political-economic 
questions of the day. How might socialism or social democracy promise greater justice than free-
market capitalism? How might capitalism be superseded or regulated without endangering liberal 
freedoms? How can a nation foster dependable economic growth while also expanding social 
equity and promoting morality? Founding his hedge fund allowed him to find fortune with ease, 
but his greater ambition still lay in finding answers to these questions. (Jones n.d.; Aron 2011; 
Burch, D. 2012; Burch, R.L.III 2012; Porter 2012).1 
At every stage of his life, Jones also occupied positions of social, cultural, or political 
advantage that afforded him disproportionate influence in determining the answers—answers he 
self-consciously strove to provide. His invention of the modern hedge fund grew out of this 
striving, and it made an important contribution to the shape of global capitalism (Knorr-Cetina 
and Preda 2004; Geithner 2004; Stultz 2007; Pike and Pollard 2010; Lysandrou 2012).2 Hedge 
funds—private, often highly leveraged investment partnerships o en only to “qualified 
investors” with personal or institutional wealth over $5 or $25 million respectively—now 
manage over $3 trillion in net assets worldwide, account for a disproportionate share of securities 
trading volume, and are designed to skirt financial regulation (Geithner 2004; Touryalai 2014).3 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 The sources providing most material for the narrative of Jones’s life, including the above photo of him circa 1932, 
are held primarily in the Alfred Winslow Jones Papers, a private collection of Adrian Jones, in Brooklyn, NY. 
Deepest thanks to the entire Jones family for their ongoing facilitation of the book project related to this article, a 
project still in very early stages. 
2 The basic structural features of a hedge fund, then and now, are fourfold: first, an overall “hedged” investment 
position through a mixture of long positions and short selling (selling borrowed securities in anticipation of buying 
them back at a lower price for return to the lender and pocketing the difference); second, using the leverage gained 
by short selling to magnify long positions (i.e., investing the proceeds from selling borrowed securities in long bets); 
third, high fees for fund managers based on performance—usually 20% of profits—plus expenses or a low 
percentage of assets under management (commonly 2% today, hence the short and for hedge fund fee structures, 
“two and 20”); and fourth, an organizational structure that enables avoidance of financial oversight, regulation, or 
taxation, whether through limiting investment or compensation strategies, the number of the firm’s partners, or other 
devices (Mallaby 2010: 2, 412 n42).  
3 From July 2011 through June 2012, hedge funds accounted for nearly a quarter of trading volume in fixed-income 
equity markets, despite managing only 1-3% of total global assets at the time (Goodman 2012; PwC 2014). 
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Jones’s creation has become a major fixture on the financial landscape, and a magnifying prism 
for capitalism’s latest round of financialization. 
On its face, then, his life would appear to offer the ideal material for that hoary historical 
form, the “great-man” biography.4 Yet this “great man” also wrestled with the continual 
recognition that structural forces were undermining his fondest hopes for social change. Indeed, 
he found himself repeatedly stymied by those manifestations of capitalism he sought to 
combat—amoral acquisitiveness, systemic volatility, and endemic inequality—and lived long 
enough to see the hedge fund, his most significant legacy, pulled into the service of their 
reproduction. In this sense, his lifetime provides a powerful argument against the capacity of the 
“great-man” biography genre to illuminate history.  It also demands a different method of 
historical accounting.  
A world-system biography of Jones may provide a method better suited for mapping the 
internal dialectics of twentieth-century capitalism’s history. Seeing Jones’s exertions in the 
context of both global political economy and the specific conditions of his life could capture the 
inadequacy of individual efforts to divert structural forces into intended pathways, and the causal 
dependence of such forces on contingent action within webs and fragments of human relations 
(Derluguian 2005). Like anyone else, Jones was molded by circumstances whose logics he 
enacted, even as he tried to alter them. More than most, he captures that fraught position at 
moments of obvious cyclical and structural transformation, as if fitting his life to Giovanni 
Arrighi’s injunction that students of capitalism “focus on those points in time that enable us to 
highlight not just cyclical but structural transformations as well. Points in time close to the 
change of phase from material to financial expansion are the most important from both points of 
view” (2004: 538). Jones presents a human connection between cyclical and structural 
transformations, and across changes of phase from financial to material expansion—and back 
again—offering a dramatic embodiment of forces whose chroniclers more often veer into a 
depopulated landscape of abstraction.  
But the value of his world-system biography goes further than modeling a détente between 
“structure” and “agency,” or populating the often arid terrain of world-systems analysis. It 
promises, also, to pay a straightforward historiographical dividend: it can bridge temporal, 
spatial, or cataclysmic historical boundaries that have impeded a full appreciation of twentieth-
century capitalism’s contiguities. A world-system biography of Jones would comfortably span a 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 I understand “great-man” (or “great-woman”) biography here as a linear account of one person’s life that leads 
teleologically toward the subject’s active transformation of history, privileging the subject as the primary, causal 
historical force. 
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century, criss-cross both the Atlantic and the global South, and fully encompass the seismic 
decades between 1914 and 1989.  
Scrutinizing key moments of Jones’s early life—a political awakening, pivotal episodes of 
activist-intellectual exploration, and a reflective assessment of his hedge fund after its first dozen 
years of operation—and placing them in local and international contexts of structural change 
suggests the potential value in this approach. It ties together usually discrete historiographies in a 
rough but coherent manner across borders: municipal Socialism in the Progressive-Era United 
States, anti-fascist politics in Weimar, left political disillusionment in the late 1930s, and a turn 
to developmental economics as a progressive refuge during and after World War II. This article 
limits its focus to the transatlantic core, but it can still begin to make narrative sense of a global 
historical arc from socialist political radicalism at the beginning of the century to an ideology of 
economic developmentalism and accelerating financial accumulation at its end.  
On another level, a world-system biography of Jones suggests a theoretical reorientation—
toward what Marc Bloch called “the human element”—for studies of capitalism’s cultural and 
material history. Such a reorientation might hold rewards for the “new history of capitalism” 
field, which until now has pursued its quarry less by following “the scent of human flesh” than 
by tracing the movements of commodities, capital, institutions, and ideas (Beckert et al. 2014; 
Levy 2012; Phillips-Fein and Zelizer 2012; Phillips-Fein 2013; Schuessler 2013; Sklansky 2014; 
Zakim and Kornblith 2012). But before we assess the historiographical implications, let us 
follow the scent of human flesh and discover where it takes us. 
 
A G.E.-Schenectady Boy’s Antediluvian Left Turn 
 
Alfred Winslow Jones was born to American parents in Melbourne, Australia, in 1900—as he 
was fond of saying, intimating auspiciousness, “in the ninth hour of the ninth day of the ninth 
month of 1900” (Jones n.d.: 7). He always retained this sense of birth-destiny, despite having had 
it contradicted in his twenties when, during his “brief sea-faring days,” he consulted “an Indian 
soothsayer…on the Singapore water-front. When I told this horoscopist about my time of birth, 
he couldn’t have been less interested, or I more disappointed” (Ibid.).  
Jones’s father, Arthur, was an M.I.T. graduate and engineer who joined the International 
General Electric Company at its inception. He spent the 1890s establishing the company’s initial 
presence in South Africa and Australia, two early sites of successful overseas sales (G.E. Digest 
1926; Anon. 1896). In 1904, G.E. recalled Arthur to the company’s hometown of Schenectady, 
New York, where he became Manager of the Department of the Far East. No doubt in part as 
compensation for more than a decade of faithful service abroad, the company ensconced the 
Joneses in the newly established “Realty Plot,” a tony suburban enclave of single-family homes 
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commissioned by G.E. to attract and retain executive talent (Maston 1983). It was from the 
comfort of such plush surroundings that Jones’s father would, as his company obituary put it, 
continue “bearing the electric torch of progress into distant markets” (G.E. Digest 1926).  
Before anything had marked Alfred Jones as special or singular, then, he was living his 
childhood at the tip of American industrial capitalism’s spear, and at a node of its accumulating 
wealth, during what economic historians sometimes refer to as the first “Golden Age” of 
globalization (Frieden 2006). He seems to have had a happy, privileged childhood, in what he 
later described as “a sort of suburban community of middle and upper GE [sic] employees.” But 
as he would write, “Schenectady, and the lives of most of the people we knew, were dominated 
by G.E.” (Jones n.d.: B9).  
This invocation of domination was apt, but incomplete. General Electric drove 
Schenectady’s swift growth and increasing wealth in the early 20th century, but the town resisted 
a wholehearted embrace of global industrial capital.5 G.E.’s Schenectady workers—many of 
whom joined the anticapitalist Industrial Workers of the World—went on strike repeatedly and 
in large numbers during Jones’s youth and adolescence. In 1911, the town elected the first 
Socialist mayor in New York State, George R. Lunn, despite warnings from Lunn’s Republican 
opponent that electing a Socialist would alienate both G.E. and American Locomotive (the city’s 
other major employer), and that the companies’ “retrenchment would be inevitable” 
(Hendrickson 1966: 26-27).  
When Lunn and the Socialist slate emerged victorious, “pandemonium reigned” and the 
“streets of the city were jammed with Lunnites and their sympathizers, delirious with glee” (Ibid: 
27). The threatened retrenchment did not materialize. When practically the entire G.E. workforce 
of 14,000—nearly 20% of the city’s population—walked off the job the next year to protest 
management’s firing of two union leaders, it was the Socialist mayor’s intercession that secured 
a pro-union settlement and resumption of work (Anon. 1913). G.E.’s hold on Schenectady and its 
development remained decisive, but the company’s political primacy—and more important, the 
town’s commitment to an industrial capitalist future lit by the “electric torch of progress”—
hardly went unchallenged during Jones’s boyhood and teenage years (Anon. 1906, 1906a and 
1907). 
His father’s position with G.E. makes it unlikely that Jones remained oblivious to all this. In 
any case, the Socialists’ municipal victories, as well as numerous strikes in Schenectady between 
1911 and 1916, reflected a broader political trend of contestation over capitalism in early-
                                                                                                                                                             
5 The American Locomotive Works also employed several thousand in the town, but its workforce was about half 
the size of G.E.’s at the time (Anon. 1911). 
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twentieth-century U.S. city politics that provided the backdrop for his developing political 
worldview. The brewing crisis in global industrial capitalism would ultimately precipitate three 
cataclysmic decades of war and want (Arrighi 1994; Dawley 1991; Hobsbawm 1987; Huyssen 
2014). Capitalism’s subjection to open questioning had become normalized, due in large part to 
popular suspicion aimed at vast, vertically integrated global corporations (such as G.E.), which 
were characteristic of the U.S. world-system to come (Arrighi 1994: 290-1).  
It was this context that made possible the only clear political turning point in Jones’s 
childhood. The shift happened at school. Jones’s teachers were trying to produce a mock 
presidential debate in advance of the 1912 election, having students stand in for Teddy 
Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson (even with a Socialist mayor, allowing 
an impersonation of Eugene Debs was apparently a bridge too far). In a testament to 
Progressivism’s discursive dominance of American politics, all three establishment candidates 
were running as nominal “Progressives,” but Wilson was still an outlier in the classroom. As
Jones notes in his manuscript memoir, because the children of G.E. executives tended to emulate 
their parents’ Republican partisanship, his classmates were eager to play either Taft or 
Roosevelt, but, 
[N]one would speak for Wilson, so I was drafted…I delivered, with a lot 
of help from a good teacher, a pretty eloquent speech. With a show of 
hands, it turned out that I had won over one little boy, and even if his 
parents were already for Wilson, this was considered to be quite an 
achievement. As the twig is bent, I have been a Democrat or a (Norman 
Thomas) Socialist ever since (Jones  n.d.: 72.3). 
Whatever the importance of this first, seemingly minor instance of his politicization, it is clearly 
entangled within the threads of domestic political-economic turmoil and globalizing industrial 
capitalism. Labor’s rejection of unfettered managerial control in Schenectady exemplified the 
wider battle over capitalism’s meanings in the early twentieth-century United States, a battle 
without which Wilson’s victory would have been implausible, and Jones’s schoolhouse exercise 
incapable of acquiring such retrospective significance for him. That battle’s legacies of domestic 
labor organizing and industrial regulation, meanwhile, would drive many capital-intensive U.S. 
corporations’ “spatio-temporal fixes” to come, feeding both local and global economic 
disruptions that confirmed Jones in his intellectual heterodoxy as he grew older (Harvey 2003). 
His own father’s work—directing an industrial behemoth’s global expansion into new territories 
ripe for capital investment—prefigured those “fixes,” while exemplifying the U.S. 
“intensification” of the British world-system’s “conquest” (Arrighi 2004).  
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In these antediluvian years, Jones’s father helped set the stage for the new world system of 
industrial U.S. power while Schenectady’s populace fought that system’s logic at its core. This 
was fertile soil for the initial seed of Jones’s political radicalism, inadvertently planted by a 
teacher’s play-acting lesson plan. That radicalism’s growth and its sequential reformations 
would, in turn, have consequences for the system. 
 
Becoming “a sort of extreme radical” 
 
Over the following twenty years, as the world-system underwent a period of lurching crises and 
revolutionary challenge, Jones’s radicalism would only grow stronger. Indeed, his self-
characterization as a Democrat or Norman Thomas Socialist is more an average of his lifetime 
political views and activities than a comprehensive description: he veered further leftward before 
reaching middle age.  
He was sufficiently radical as a Harvard undergraduate to be tagged for decades afterward, 
by some classmates at least, with the nickname “Pinko” (Porter 2012). He graduated in 1923, 
into a yearlong recession. After successive positions as a purser on a tramp steamer, a clerk at n 
import/export business, and an analyst at Cox & Trainer Investment Counsel (a position he took 
in 1927 in the wake of his father’s death, to learn how to steward the family bequest), his 
leeriness toward unrestrained capitalism received apparent and sharp justification in the great 
stock-market crash of 1929. Two years’ work at Cox & Trainer had given him the foresight to 
establish extensive short positions in early summer of 1929, but he lost his nerve and covered 
those positions during what he called the “last, final spasm in the form of a summer rally.… [I] 
didn’t come back to any sort of interest in investment or speculation,” he wrote, “for twenty 
years” (Jones  n.d.: A95-96). He entered the Foreign Service instead, and by January 1931 when 
he arrived in Berlin for his vice consular posting at the U.S. Embassy, he counted himself “a sort 
of extreme radical…a naïve sympathizer of the Soviet Union” (Ibid.: A98).  
This led him into friendship and association with dissident German communists who would 
go on to found the socialist anti-Nazi group Neu Beginnen. Jones spied on Nazis with this group 
and helped to compile reports on National Socialist activities for nearly three full years, gaining a 
reputation with his comrades for “quite unusual zeal” and unimpeachable “personal integrity” 
(Frank to Adler 1934). He grew close with one of the group’s members in particular, a dynamic 
young woman named Anna Block. In 1932 they married, resulting in his honorable resignation 
from the Foreign Service (Jones to Messersmith 1932; Messersmith to Secretary of State 1932).  
Jones initially went back to New York after his resignation, but almost immediately 
rejoined Block in Germany, where he remained long enough to witness the Nazi rise to power, 
continue his espionage work, and write cautionary opinion pieces under a pseudonym for The 
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New Republic. In them, he warned explicitly and urgently of National Socialism’s true 
murderousness—with particular attention to the persecution of communists (Frank to Adler 
1934; Jones, a.k.a. Y.K.W. 1933 1933a 1933b). These pieces display a foresight rare in 
American public discourse regarding Nazis at the time, appearing in April and May 1933, over a 
year before the Night of the Long Knives. They also display a more profound (and widely 
shared) lack of foresight, in their pervasive assumption that their author and readers were living 
through, as Jones puts it matter-of-factly, “the period of history known as the decline of 
capitalism” (Jones, a.k.a. Y.K.W. 1933). 
 Decades later, Jones would regard himself—as many American radicals during that period 
came to do—with a combination of condescending approbation and rue (High 2009). “I have 
mixed feelings about this…German experience and what followed,” he wrote in the late 1970s. 
“I’m glad about what I learned and I’m glad that I reacted in that radical manner to the world 
crisis of the early thirties” (Jones n.d.: A97). In retrospect, however, he judged that reaction to be 
the result of “the dreadful conditions” having “played on neurotic traits in me and turned me into 
a sort of extreme radical” (Ibid.: A98). In his self-narration, the “extreme radical” who had so 
casually imagined himself living through—indeed, actively attempting to accelerate—“the 
period of history known as the decline of capitalism” was not truly him. The “dreadful 
conditions” associated with that period of history were an alien state of affairs, about which he 
could “rather confidently” advise his grandchildren, “you will never see anything like that” 
(Ibid.: A97).  
 
Epochal Shifts and Radical Nostalgia 
 
There is a plausible (if unduly narrow) case for ascribing Jones’s turn away from the radical left 
solely to his romantic life. He and Anna Block divorced in 1934, and he returned to the United 
States. Block, a descendant of a German-Jewish banking family, had been a linchpin of Jones’s 
involvement in Neu Beginnen’s activities in Berlin, perhaps not least because she offered him a 
model of left political zeal in a bourgeois peer (Mallaby 2010). Whatever the impelling reason 
for their divorce, breaking from Block meant separating himself from a close personal 
relationship that had sustained his early socialist instincts and loyalties. 
     With his career in the Foreign Service interrupted and his Marxism undimmed, Jones decided 
to channel his political-intellectual interest in class relations (and perhaps his “neurotic traits”) 
toward a doctoral program in sociology at Columbia University. He helped Robert and Helen 
Lynd with research for Middletown in Transition (1937), and began to conceptualize his thesis 
project on classed attitudes toward corporate property in a midwestern manufacturing city, 
Akron, Ohio (Jones 1941). Yet he remained wistfully nostalgic about his days as a spy. His 
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daughter recalled how, after his homecoming, a friend from his youth overheard him introduce 
himself to someone at a cocktail party under an alias. Unsuspecting and incredulous, the friend 
intervened and revealed him, much to his embarrassment (Burch, D. 2012). 
     In 1935, he also met Mary Carter, a young clerical worker and illustrator in Columbia’s 
neurobiology department. Carter had grown up on a Virginia tobacco plantation and had moved 
to New York originally planning to do work with children, but had taken the job at Columbia 
when the opportunity presented itself through Southern connections. She was progressive, and 
hardly in a conventional bourgeois way—she would remain politically active and engaged in 
social justice causes for the rest of her life, joining the March on Washington for Jobs and 
Freedom in 1963, advising New York mayors on desegregating public education, and ultimately 
leading the Henry Street Settlement on the Lower East Side. Yet she was also somewhat more 
reserved in her progressivism and her expectations of Jones than Block had been (Burch, D. 
2012; Weiner and Jones 1993).  
     Jones and Carter quickly fell in love, and married in September 1936. In a variety of ways, 
Carter6 would sustain Jones’s lifelong interest in social justice work, but in some basic material 
dimensions—not least the need to support a family in New York, and her desire to raise their 
children without the encumbrance of a paying job—she would also have a moderating effect on 
his radicalism (Burch, D. 2012). The fundamental effect of such transitions in personal lives on 
political outlook and activity cannot be discounted. Indeed, Jones underlined it himself, claiming 
his marriage as the t ctonic shift in his life, between what he called the “AM” and “PM” periods: 
“Ante Maria” and “Post Maria” (Jones n.d.: 61).  
     This epochal transition, however, also involved the newly married Joneses’ trip as 
humanitarian observers to the Spanish Civil War, a moment marking a far wider epochal shift in 
global political economy, with complicated consequences for left politics. Franklin Roosevelt 
followed his triumphant 1936 re-lection with a mixture of political overreach (the “court-
packing” affair) and ill-advised austerity policies, feeding a rightward popular backlash against 
the New Deal in the U.S., and an economic crash even more sudden than that of 1929 (Brinkley 
1995). Stalin’s Moscow Trials, begun in 1936, started their work of alienation and fragmentation 
among western socialist intellectuals like Jones (Wald 1987; Takayoshi 2011). And the 
combination of Nazi re-armament, Francoist rebellion, and the ongoing economic crisis of the 
interwar period across Europe—aggravated by renewed recession in the U.S.—further eroded the 
already shaky edifice of world capitalism.  
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Mary Carter took Jones’s surname upon marrying him, but I will continue referring to her as “Carter” for clarity’s 
sake.  
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     Written decades later, Jones’s account of their decision to go to Spain reflects the 
disappointed ambivalence of active leftists and self-identifying socialists toward the manner of 
capitalism’s apparent disintegration. He indicts the American, French, and British governments 
for abiding by the non-intervention agreement in the face of Hitler and Mussolini’s flagrant 
violations of it, while offering an implicit defense of Stalin’s decision to limit Soviet aid (for fear 
of sparking “general war”). He also expresses admiration for the courage of International 
Brigade volunteers, yet explains, “I had no idea of doing this – partly because I wasn’t that brave 
and partly because it was dominated by Communists” (Jones n.d. A131-133). Whether repulsed 
by the Moscow Trials’ ghoulish hypocrisy and the dogmatism of communists and fellow 
travelers who defended them, or because of some other alienating experience with communism 
during the mid-1930s, Jones had clearly lost whatever naïve sympathy he had been harboring for 
the Soviet experiment.  
     Still, he felt compelled to act as a man of the left. In the end, he says simply of his and 
Carter’s reasons for going to Spain: “[We] wanted to do what we could” (Ibid. A132). Carter 
confirmed this impulse years later, recounting breezily how he had said to her, “You know, 
there’s a war going on in Spain. We ought to go” (Weiner and Jones 1993). 
 
 
From Naïve Sympathy to Deliberate Economism 
 
Arriving in Puigcerdà on July 31 1937, the couple traveled through Loyalist territory, moving 
between Barcelona, Lerida, Quinto, Belchite, Caspe, Valencia, Madrid, and Murcia. They stayed 
in the country for three and a half months, witnessing internal conflict between communists and 
anarchists, terrible suffering in air raid destruction, and hunger in refugee camps. They were 
particularly affected by the hunger of children, and helped establish a children’s hospital near 
Murcia (Jones and Jones 1938; Weiner and Jones 1993). By their own account, they left Spain 
“with a mixture of feelings—affection for the most magnetic and attractive people in the world; 
hope for them in the latest phase of their old struggle against oppression and backwardness; and 
some little relief at leaving an atmosphere so charged with the abnormal emotions of civil war 
and social crisis” (Jones and Jones 1938: 11). 
     The language of “feelings…affection…hope…and…relief” suggests a careful avoidance of 
overt leftist politics, hardly surprising as the Joneses were writing under the auspices of the 
American Friends Service Committee and the American Unitarian Association. These 
institutional affiliations alone would have blunted any sharp political edge to their report. 
Moreover, the idealistic newlyweds hoped that their testimonial, if read widely enough, might 
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help spur American provision of aid to the Loyalists. Hectoring readers would not have been to 
their advantage.  
     Their use of phrases such as “backwardness,” and “abnormal emotions,” however, and their 
praise of the Spanish as “the most magnetic and attractive people in the world” also suggest an 
uncomfortable amalgam of developmentalism and cultural essentialism infusing Jones’s earlier 
Marxist materialism. The conclusion of the report confirms this shift in perspective. Jones and 
Carter write, “In Spain live people who are very close to us in cultural tradition, but who, for 
certain reasons, have not kept pace with the development of western civilization. It is 
undoubtedly this lag which has caused the present internal crisis in Spain and which has involved 
Spain as a victim in an important prelude to a world-wi e paroxysm” (Jones and Jones 1938: 
32). Residual leftist political loyalties had brought Jones to Spain. He left it with a growing 
fixation on questions of economic development and distribution, misrecognizing the mutually 
constitutive relationship between Spain’s historic underdevelopment and what he and Carter 
called “the development of western civilization.” 
     Indeed, his and Carter’s analytical implication that economic aid and development toward 
standards of “western civilization” might reverse, or at least stall the advance of war and 
suffering in Spain shows early hints of the postwar European world in which, as Tony Judt 
describes, “economics displaced politics as the goal and language of collective action” (2005: 
236). Judt reads this displacement primarily as a pragmatic response to the physical devastations 
of war. Seen through a world-systemic lens, it emerges over a longer time-horizon as an 
extension of the protectionist responses to the British-centered world-system’s monetary 
instability after 1918, further destabilization caused by 1920s “capital flight,” and the speculative 
crisis of 1929 (Arrighi 1994: 281-283). Meg Jacobs has traced yet a third, even longer historical 
trajectory toward “economic citizenship” in the early twentieth-century United States, recasting 
American politics in that period as increasingly constituting a fight over questions of 
consumption (2005).  
Jones, in a sense, forged his political identity in the crucible of all three interpretations: he 
was born into the onset of the domestic dynamics Jacobs describes, worked within the British 
world-system’s financial unraveling as an investment analyst right up to Black Tuesday, and 
witnessed the devastation of war firsthand in Spain (Jones n.d.). By the time he and Carter left 
Spain, these cumulative experiences had begun to build a bridge from an earlier self-conception 
as a radical political actor in service of replacing an irretrievably moribund capitalism with 
socialism, to a later one as an economic actor with a limited focus on stable economic growth as 
a necessary sedative for dangerous political and military turmoil.  
 His doctoral research would extend that bridge. When he returned to the United States, he 
moved to Akron for fieldwork on differential “attitude[s] toward corporate property” and their 
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correspondence to social and economic class position (Jones 1941). Although his findings clearly 
demonstrate the deleterious social and political consequences of adherence to a rigidly liberal 
conception of property rights, he hedges on drawing politically charged conclusions. He points 
first to “radicals who would abolish most if not all of the rights of corporate property,” then to 
“Liberals and…conservatives [who] feel that at least certain aspects of corporate property rights, 
such as monopoly powers, have come to act as impediments to the smooth working of the 
economic system.” Then he punts: “Our findings do not permit us to judge the relative merits of 
these positions.”  
 Reducing the political question of rights on which his book centers to a pragmatic matter of 
economic development’s popular appeal, he declares, “It goes without saying that the systemic 
problem is all-important. If those with political power, or those who aspire to it, are unable or 
unwilling to bring about economic conditions that satisfy the people, the way will be open to 
blind and destructive social strivings whose final consequences are unpredictable” (1941: 353). 
Bringing about “economic conditions that satisfy the people” would be the predominant, if not 
exclusive site of Jones’s ethical and political imagination for the remainder of his life. It is ironic, 
but not inexplicable, that his invention of the hedge fund should be the most lasting result of that 
adaptation. 
 
 
“Free enterprise…is its own worst enemy” 
 
Jones described the hedge fund’s purpose as the use of “speculative means for conservative 
ends” (Burch, RLIV).7 This is a far cry from the popular contemporary understanding of hedge 
funds as institutions with a propensity for both profiting from and causing economic 
fluctuation—speculative means for orgiastic ends might be more like it—but by the time Jones 
began work on creating his fund in 1948, one could credibly say that his leftism did have 
“conservative ends” in mind, in the sense of conserving the apparent social benefits of postwar 
peace: economic stability, steady growth, and an ever-widening umbrella of material 
improvement that mitigated against “blind and destructive social strivings whose final 
consequences are unpredictable” (Jones 1941: 353).   
Such purposes, of course, were not particularly “conservative” by the standards of early 
1940s American politics. Despite an increasing willingness to acknowledge the effectiveness of 
free-market incentives in producing growth (or as he put it in his book, property’s “firm position 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Loomis offers a slightly different quote from Jones in 1966: “speculative techniques for conservative ends” 
(Loomis 1966). 
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as a value”), Jones did not so much repudiate his earlier socialism as fit its ethics to changing 
political-economic conditions (Ibid.: 354). His writings during the decade before he created 
A.W. Jones and Co.—as a sociologist, a contributor to Fortune, and the Director of Research at 
the Institute for Applied Social Analysis—consistently reflect his belief that collective economic 
security was the best guarantor of true freedom, not the other way around.8 In this, his 
“conservative ends” actually reflected his commitment to one of the U.S. liberal-left’s dearest 
political-economic goals: interventionist state policy to ensure full employment (Brinkley 1995: 
260-4).  
His manuscripts and published articles in this period express the tortured emergence of 
embedded liberalism from a chrysalis of ecumenical Marxism and social-democratic 
disenchantment with the Soviet model (Harvey 2005: 10-11). In “The Free Market and the 
Future,” a manuscript dated two days after Pearl Harbor, Jones seems first to defend the free 
market, writing “where the market is done away with, [the] yawning gulf between the highest 
and the lowest is naked and unashamed…even in Russia, which passed through the profoundest 
revolution of history, the revolutionary enthusiasm wears off leaving no tie between man and 
man but naked bureaucracy” (Jones 1941a: 8). Yet a few pages later, he writes, “It is fairly 
obvious that there will be appalling economic problems [after the war] and no royal road to their 
solution, such as a post-war democratic world order. We certainly want a new democratic 
internationalism…But there should be no illusions about the need for radical measures for this 
country” (Jones 1941a: 12). His advocacy of “radical measures,” expressed through the 
admonition, borrowed directly from Capital’s first volume, that there is “no royal road” (to 
science or economic utopia), bespeaks a continuing intellectual loyalty to Marx. He underlines 
his leeriness of veering to the right a few pages later: 
If the lessons provided by the Soviet Union have helped drive the left 
away from socialism, they have certainly not driven it and the left-center 
stampeding back to laissez faire. For after everything possible has been 
said about the connection between the market and democracy, it remains 
obvious that the free market, left to itself, does not remain free. The way 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Jones was a primary mover in creating the Institute for Applied Social Analysis, a study group aimed at bringing 
the best academic research to bear on persistent problems of U.S. economic life—abov  all, unemployment. Once 
the group gained funding, his position as Director of Research gave him ffective power to shape its agenda in the 
name of its board members, among whom were some of the nation’s leading leftist intellectuals, including Charles 
Beard, George Soule (labor economist and editor of The New Republic), and Jones’s dissertation advisor, Robert S. 
Lynd (Bingham collection). 
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things work in the modern world, free enterprise – free to do what it 
wants in the way of combination and price fixing – is its own worst 
enemy. (Jones 1941a: 15). 
He echoes this analysis with a telling abstraction in a treatise on hoarding the following 
year: “What the individual does to promote his own interest creates a social catastrophe that acts 
directly against his own interest” (Jones 1942: 5). In a confidential memo to the Fortune editorial 
staff later that year, he declares,  
The outstanding trend in government, business and labor, seems to be in 
from the left and right to a dual goal: (1) full employment, and (2) the 
maximization of free, competitive, private enterprise. Note that full 
employment is here stated as an absolute, to which free enterprise is 
relative – the formulation is not free enterprise as an absolute, and then 
the maximum of employment…In this country’s past security has been 
based on freedom; in the future, freedom will be based on security (Jones 
1942a: 1). 
In February 1944, he took this generalization a step further, specifying that in the interest of the 
public good, the federal government’s anti-monopoly strictures should be enforced without 
regard to the alleged dangers of lower profits. “Lower profits of any sort would normally act to 
curtail certain sorts of enterprise,” he writes, “but this would be entirely overcome by the 
enhanced business confidence due to an underwritten level of consumer spending” (Jones 1944: 
3). He accordingly advocated a federal plan for cash supplements to maintain consumer spending 
at appropriate levels, and the establishment of a “coordinating agency in the Office of the 
President acting under specific grants of power from Congress and directing the Treasury, the 
public works planning agency, the Federal Reserve Board and all other government agencies 
insofar as their activities bear upon this program” (Ibid.: 5-6).  
While working for a flagship publication of Henry Luce’s global media empire—among 
the most powerful propaganda machines for classically liberal economic principles and 
economic developmentalism abroad in the years to come—Jones still articulated his vision of 
development in the language of robust Keynesian bureaucracy, not free-market exuberance 
(C.L.R. James 1948). He was trying to achieve his youthful socialist goals through New Deal 
state machinery (Radford 2003). 
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The gentle, orderly hedge fund 
 
Prioritizing the public good, steady growth, and risk reduction over profits: this was Jones’s 
repeatedly articulated position on economic policy in the years immediately before his creation 
of the hedge fund, and it is reflected in the most complete statement of his intentions with the 
fund itself: a 1961 paper entitled, the “Basic Report to the Partners On the Fully Committed 
Fund” (A.W. Jones & Co. 1961: 10).  
Looking back over the fund’s twelve and a half years of operation up to that point, the 
“Basic Report” is striking not only for the relative absence of self-congratulation—which would 
have been justified, given that the fund doubled the after-tax returns of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average’s blue-chip stocks during one of the great bull markets of the postwar period—but even 
more, for its continual invocation of risk minimization (Ibid.: 10). If there is one point this 
document aims to convey, it is that the higher returns to be gained through a hedged method of 
investing were, in management’s view, only a secondary benefit to the minimization of risk to 
capital. “[T]he most important of the unique features of our operation,” the report declares, “is 
the lowering of risk and increase of profit potential by hedging” (Ibid.). To borrow Jones’s 1942 
assessment of the relationship between full employment and free enterprise, lowering risk “is 
here stated as an absolute,” whereas profit “is relative.” 
The report’s attitude toward leverage reflects its broader goal of risk minimization.9 The 
fund operated with “at least twice [its] net worth,” and though this may seem laughably low 
through the glass darkly of today’s leverage norms in double-digit multiples, one should bear in 
mind that, as the report notes, short-selling in the early 1960s, not to speak of the late 1940s 
when Jones created the firm, was still a “little-known, usually speculative, and irrationally 
frightening procedure”; the report itself acknowledged this (Ibid.: 4). Presumably with that in 
mind, Jones noted, “There is a prudent limit to the sums we should borrow for use even in the 
safe and profitable hedged part of the fund” (Ibid.: 27). 
This language of “prudence” and “safety” reflects a conservatism also exhibited in an 
appendix to the report that details the fund’s methods. In a passage clearly meant to assuage 
anxieties about the nature of short selling, Jones challenges what he calls “illusions” about the 
practice. One such illusion, he notes, “is that the practice is immoral or anti-social.” He leaves to 
the reader the question of why such an “illusion” might exist, but its basis is implied: the idea 
that it promises profit off the dissolution or destruction of economic value rather than its growth. 
This idea had already been around for at least half a century before Jones created his fund. As 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Indeed, Jones’s conservatism on leverage was one of the characteristics that distinguished his fund from its more 
reckless descendants. 
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muckraker Lincoln Steffens put it succinctly when considering the panic of 1893, “The shorts 
rejoiced in ruin; they made money, and they were happy” (Steffens 1931: 187).  
On the contrary, writes Jones, “the successful short seller is performing a useful market 
function in that he arrests an unjustified rise in a stock by selling it, and then”—and this part is 
crucial—“later cushions its fall by buying it back, thus moderating its fluctuations” (A.W. Jones 
& Co. 1961: 35).10 This is a theory of short selling as an economically stabilizing practice—
“speculative means for conservative ends.” It is not a justification unique to Jones, but in the 
context of the way he conceived his fund, it was indispensable. The Basic Report further 
underlines this point by insisting, “It…must be made clear that such a program cannot be put into 
operation without careful and continuous controls” (Ibid.: 36). Jones had a vision for his “hedged 
fund,” as he called it, that in addition to giving him far greater earning power than he would have 
enjoyed as a sociologist or journalist, would ideally counteract the sort of irrational volatility of 
the late 1920s or vicious-cycle desperation of the 1930s, contributing to broadly shared 
prosperity.  
Jones was eighteen years old by the end of World War I, an investor during the Crash of 
1929, a self-identifying socialist spy witness to the rise of Nazi power in Germany, a student of 
class antagonism in the heartland of industrial America during a period of intense political 
protest and deep doubt about capitalism’s continuing viability, and a Spanish Loyalist 
sympathizer who did humanitarian work in refugee camps and orphanages throughout 1937, 
occasionally dipping into the odd anarcho-syndicalist rally in Barcelona (Jones  n.d.). 
Everywhere he went for the first half of his life, he confronted chaos, devastation, and political-
economic upheaval in new and terrifying forms. In the years immediately before creating his 
fund, he remained fixated on figuring out how to intervene in such dynamics.  
Given these experiences, his continuing devotion to an ideal of global social justice, and 
the way he described the fund’s purposes in the Basic Report, it seems clear that p rt of Jones’s 
motivation in setting up his “hedged fund” was to exert a stabilizing influence on the economy. 
In fact, he essentially said so himself. In the final paragraph of a March 1949 Fortune a ticle on 
market forecasting techniques—the research for which the previous year had led him most 
directly to the hedge fund idea—he wrote, “Now, if enough investors and speculators come to an 
advanced technical approach…it is interesting to speculate about the eventual result. It would 
mitigate the irrational swings of the most important of the capital markets, which would then 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Emphasis added. 
 
Journal of World-Systems Research   | Vol. # 21 No. 2 |  From Socialism to Hedge Fund 
 
jwsr.org   |   http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.9 
 
304 
fluctuate in a relatively gentle, orderly way to accommodate itself to fundamental changes only” 
(1949: 186).  
Then he hedged: “But it is still a little utopian to think that technicians, however able, 
will soon work themselves out of their present advantage” (Ibid.). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary hedge funds—many leveraged to the hilt and empowered by high-frequency-
trading software—are the material and symbolic quintessence of the current, hyper-financialized 
world-system and its ongoing crises of inequality and overaccumulation, a maximizing vector for 
what David Harvey calls the “vulture capitalism” of our day (Arrighi 2004; Harvey 2005). Yet 
they were conceived by a man who had spent decades devoted to rectifying the political-
economic chaos that followed an earlier crisis of overaccumulation, only to find himself on the 
cusp of another era of massive material expansion. A historical materialist—through struggle 
with his self-conception, the specific conditions of his life, and what he believed to be a “period 
of history known as the decline of capitalism”—midwifed the perfect vessel for another process 
of financial over-expansion and crisis.  
The contrast between Jones’s exertions and accomplishments tells a contiguous, human 
history of these shifts, a history that lies not in the abstract or vainglorious self-interest of 
corporate malefactors or imperialist state powers, but in the attempts of a young socialist-turned-
economic sociologist to marry his analysis of social inequality under capitalism to material 
needs—both his own, and the world’s. That history underscores the fact that it is not enough to 
know the world-system as a system alone; an adequate grasp, much less an understanding that 
could serve as the basis for intervention, must grapple with the system’s human element in 
equally rigorous, dialectical fashion. 
In arguing this point, I want to return to the idea that Jones’s story offers particular 
benefits to that burgeoning historiographical phenomenon, the “new history of capitalism” field. 
The “new history of capitalism” has captivated U.S. historians in many subfields recently, but 
some scholars have expressed doubts as to its novelty, charging its practitioners with returning 
disproportionately to the staple methods of a more traditional business history (Scheussler 2013; 
Sklansky 2014; Johnson 2014). Even when applying the critical tools of the cultural turn to 
institutional, corporate, and financial records in new and generative ways, the “new” historians 
of capitalism have encountered criticism that their related methodological and subject choices 
have unduly narrowed their gaze, fixing it on the workings of the Anglo-American white male 
elite—through financial or corporate power, commodity chains, and state or institutional 
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transformation—while considering women, the working class, and people of color primarily as 
pawns on a capitalist chessboard (Phillips-Fein 2013; Sklansky 2014; Connolly, forthcoming).  
Yet this narrowing of gaze is only part of the problem, and abandoning white male 
financiers as subjects of historical inquiry is not the solution (an article whose central subject is a 
wealthy white male financier would, in any case, be a poor vessel for advising such 
abandonment).  
The problem lies not centrally with the choice to write about such subjects, but with the 
twin assumptions that such a choice too often betrays: first, that financiers and businessmen can 
teach us the most about capitalism because they wield more power under capitalism than others 
do; and second, that financiers and businessmen can tell us the most about capitalism through 
their financial and business activities.11 These assumptions bear a distorted relationship to 
Marx’s framework in the first volume of Capital for approaching individuals as “merely 
personifications of economic relations” (1990: 179). “Marx is concerned with the economic roles 
that people play,” explains David Harvey, “rather than with the individuals who play them” 
(2010: 47-48). The same could be said of many scholars of capitalism, Marxist or otherwise.12  
But approaching individuals as “personifications of economic relations” from the outset 
pre-empts crucial questions related to Marc Bloch’s “human element” of history. What are the 
specific historical conditions that guide individuals into such personifications? How do they 
struggle within these historically specific encasements; to escape them, to fit them more 
comfortably, or perhaps, to transcend or destroy them? How might the historically contingent 
and material ligatures binding them to their “economic roles”—rather than the adoption or 
enactment of those roles alone—reveal something crucial about the history of capitalism and its 
transformations? It was asking questions like these—asking them of himself, as much as of 
others—that led Jones to create the hedge fund. Ignoring such questions by conflating him with 
his economic role in creating it would first reflect, then reproduce an impoverished history of 
capitalism and humanity alike.13 
Paying attention to this human element by attending to “micro-interactions…within 
macro-contexts” can make studying the elite a much less elitist enterprise (Derluguian 2005: 10). 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Hyman asserts, “Agency still matters to us, but we confine it to the powerful few who shaped commerce and 
industry. We ask more questions about firms, who still have power today, than about movements, who do not” 
(Hyman 2013). It is worth noting here that numerous scholars who count themselves—or could be counted—as 
participants or engaged observers of the “new history of capitalism” field do not share this view (e.g., Nathan D.B. 
Connolly, Aaron Jakes, Walter Johnson, Bethany Moreton, Donna Murch, Set  Rockman, Jeffrey Sklansky, Andrew 
Zimmerman). 
12 I am indebted to Aaron Jakes for this insight, and for pointing me to this passage in Harvey. 
13 I draw here on Walter Johnson’s elegant disassembly of the “agency” trope in slavery scholarship (Johnson 
2003). 
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A more fully fleshed-out world-system biography of Jones, for instance, would reveal the critical 
influence of strong female relations, unionized electrical laborers, German-Jewish socialists, 
African-American domestic workers, Spanish refugee children, Akron rubber workers, and 
Lower East Side settlement residents (among others) in determining his path toward the hedge 
fund.14 It could not omit workers and spaces of production; neglect the ways in which race, 
gender, and class mold the experience of capitalism into invidiously distinctive shapes that affect 
capitalist development; or fail to engage seriously with collective action as a consequential 
counterpoint of capitalist power.  
Insofar as the recent “new history of capitalism” has reproduced those lacunae, it may be 
as much the result of historiographical accident as of methodological strategy, traceable to the 
origins of the field itself. Sven Beckert, the earliest and primary promoter of the field as such, 
has forthrightly declared his desire to revive the study of the elite (Shenk 2014a). Long before 
anyone had heard of a “new history of capitalism,” Beckert was rejecting the “infatuation with 
oppositional culture” he saw in the New Social and cultural turns (2001: 341n55). “[In] their 
desire to rescue the historical agency of the downtrodden,” he avers in the introduction to his 
first book, “social historians often ignored the balance of social power and relocated the 
struggles over social power into the sphere of culture. As a consequence, they neglected the most 
powerful social group in the nineteenth-century United States— he bourgeoisie” (2001: 10).  
Nearly a decade and a half later, there remains ample justification in Beckert’s call for 
historians to keep their sights trained on the elite. Yet for all the richness of this still developing 
field, its most ardent advocates may be taking his corrective further than he intended, prioritizing 
the structural power and economic roles of elites to the exclusion of their humanity, not to speak 
of capitalism’s operations within the daily lives of ordinary people, and those people’s role in 
shaping—not just experiencing—history (Sklansky 2014: 34). In doing so they neglect the 
historical tension that Beckert explicitly recognized: before he named the bourgeoisie as “the 
most powerful social group,” he took the trouble to locate them within “struggles over social 
power.”  
Examining the history of capitalism through deeply contextualized lives—whether of the 
elite, the oppressed, or both—may be one of American history’s most fertile areas, and it need 
not re-parochialize that history, nor imagine it as a necessarily American-centric story (as many 
of the “new histories of capitalism” have also done, explicitly or by inference). Instead, it could 
offer narrative terra firma for a different story of political-economic development in global 
perspective, one that makes flesh and blood the equal of systems as an analytical priority (Baptist 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 It would also thereby connect, as Kim Phillips-Fein has recommended, a material history of inequality to the 
history of risk “both as a social fact and as a way of thinking about the world” (Phillips-Fein 2013). 
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2012; Johnson 1999 and 2013; Shenk 2014). Beckert, for one, seems to be moving his 
scholarship in this direction (Beckert 2014). 
Jones’s life reminds us that internal human struggles over questions of social power 
matter to the course of capitalism’s history. The “human element” of history lies in those internal 
struggles, in the fraught space between individuals and the systemic economic roles they come to 
inhabit—as Marx had it—“not under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (1963: 15). World-
system biography as a method promises to excavate that human element, plumbing the 
unresolved tensions between the idealized, continually reconfiguring substance of individual life-
worlds, and the durable—but not inevitable—structures of the material world. It is at the 
throbbing center of those tensions—and not simply from the commanding heights of capital and 
state mastery, or the recovered “agency” of the oppressed—that capitalism and history are made, 
reimagined, and reconstituted. 
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